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Abstract: Harnad (2016) presents an engaging and persuasive argument that stakes out the aims 
and domain of the fledgling journal, Animal Sentience. As an inaugural editorial, it does this job 
masterfully, but it does so from a perspective that tends to treat mental states in an overly 
general manner and that makes hard distinctions between mental and behavioral phenomena. I 
argue that when it comes to animal minds, it might be more helpful to think of mental concepts 
in a more piecemeal way that also retains the intrinsic relation between mind and behavior. 
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In the introduction to his insightful inaugural editorial, Harnad (2016) asks, "What does it mean 
to 'have a mind'?" His answer, in part a response to Descartes, is that it "feels like something to 
think ... or to be in any other mental state," and that therefore, "Mental states are felt states, 
and to have a mind means to have the capacity to feel. In a word: sentience" (Harnad, 2016, p. 
3, emphasis in original). Although defining mental states in this manner has the potential to 
unify human and nonhuman animal minds and the study thereof, it also poses at least three 
challenges.  
 
First, as this position retains the Cartesian split between mind and behavior, it runs the risk of 
distorting the process of mental state attribution by assuming we can only be sure about our 
own minds but have to rely on inference for the minds of others; however, there is no certainty 
per se in the first-person case. Second, it collapses over a variety of differences in our mental 
vocabularies and geographies that are often better kept distinct; that is, whereas certain mental 
concepts essentially involve feelings, many do not, and furthermore, whereas we have a pretty 
good sense of what people mean when they claim they know what an object feels like, it is less 
clear what a felt mental state consists of (other than typically being accompanied by a verbal 
report or characteristic pattern of behavior as in other mental states). Third, when discussing 
mindreading, although it is helpful to know the content of a particular mental state, or whether 
one can even be sensibly attributed, it is also relevant to know whether the agents themselves 
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understand their own mental life and that of others; although a capacity to feel is surely 
required for such understanding, it is not the same thing as it, and it is often useful to 
distinguish subjectivity from intersubjectivity.  
 
Harnad's (2016) solution to these challenges seems to mostly lie in language; humans use 
languages to express our internal states to others and to understand the mental states of 
others; we can also, as language users, often infer the mental lives of others from their 
nonverbal behavior. Accordingly, then, the other-minds problem is minimal for humans in 
typical circumstances because we rely on our languages, and, particularly, in the case of 
nonverbal behavior, presumably also context. Therefore, for Harnad (2016), the problem of 
other minds mostly "arises only when speech is not possible and behavior is absent or minimal, 
such as in deep sleep or coma or under anaesthesia" (p. 3). 
 
Kiley-Worthington's (2016) commentary takes issue with this characterization and points out 
that other animals are not comparable to preverbal or mentally challenged persons, nor are 
animals simply controlled by instincts (Wereha & Racine, 2012). However, Kiley-Worthington's 
depiction of human language as context independent versus the context-dependent 
communication systems in many species tends to make human communication appear far less 
contextual than it actually might be, which can encourage us to easily overlook the necessary 
relation between mind and behavior no matter what species we might have in mind. I do agree 
with Harnad (2016) though that when it comes to the human folk psychological concepts that 
we typically import into our discussions of animal mentality, humans are the superior mind 
readers overall; it is important to bear in mind though that in many ways we have no choice, as 
human observers, but to apply human psychological concepts to nonhuman animals, thereby 
reinforcing this superiority. 
 
One way to bring this point to life is to discuss Kiley-Worthington's (2016) use of Clever Hans as 
an example of mindreading. The point is well taken and it is indeed clever for a horse to behave 
in such a manner; it suggests quite a bit about sensitivity to subtle cues that humans often 
overlook. However, as clever as Hans might be, this would likely not pass muster as mindreading 
for a developmental psychologist even if performed by the cleverest of nonverbal humans. The 
reason is that this example would probably be seen as best explained as a learned association 
that does not require any inference about the minds of Clever Hans's audience or his trainer. 
Here though, one could argue that the other-minds problem truly takes center stage because if 
a behavior counts as mindreading in the right context, then why should it matter what causes 
the behavior to be exhibited? This runs the risk of conflating causal and definitional issues in 
mental state attribution (Racine, 2015). However, a horse tapping out a response to a math 
question is an unusual definition of mindreading and a restricted sense of the concept; we 
would probably want to see what else Clever Hans is able to do. Similarly, and less 
controversially perhaps, developmental and comparative psychologists continue to argue over 
whether pointing gestures, by ape or human, are learned, and the extent to which they index 
first order versus second order intentionality (Racine, 2012). How can debates like these be 
resolved?  
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Harnad's (2016) position is helpful because it reminds us of the grounds for mental state 
attribution, which require the right sort of circumstances in the background for the verbal (or 
nonverbal) behavior to mean what it does. So, a human infant pointing to request an object 
from a caregiver in a typical Western family and a chimpanzee doing the same of a human 
caregiver from a cage would both be pointing in the same circumstances, and whatever 
mentality this evidences of the agents in question would be granted to both (Leavens & Racine, 
2009). Whether human infants do this because of mindreading skills and chimps do it because of 
social shaping might be interesting causally, if empirically tractable, but it would not tell us 
anything about the degree of mentality exhibited — unless one decides by fiat that anything 
that might be acquired instrumentally or through conditioning is less psychologically interesting 
(Tomasello, 2014). The problem though is that when the behavioral grounds for the attribution 
of some form of understanding are largely identical in human and nonhuman animals, as is the 
case in these sorts of request games, then there are no independent grounds for determining 
whether a given behavior requires some sort of special representational understanding that is 
potentially absent in nonhuman animals (Racine, 2012). 
 
A way of getting around this issue might be to question the utility of the representational 
paradigm for nonhuman mentality, which is a move that Kiley-Worthington (2016) could be 
seen to imply. Johnson (2001), for example, suggests that a distributed model of cognition might 
be more fruitful for characterizing and investigating the mental lives of nonhuman animals. 
However, Harnad (2005) reminds us that, "the processes that generate thinking and know-how 
are ‘distributed’ within the heads of thinkers, but not across thinkers’ heads" (p. 501). His 
conclusion is that "Hence, there is no such thing as distributed cognition.’’ However, perhaps 
conceiving of "cognition as a family of interrelated but non-identical activities is helpful here 
because it avoids the need to make a dichotomous choice regarding whether or not cognition is 
distributed (or extended, situated, etc.)" (Susswein & Racine, 2009, p. 186). And perhaps, 
whether or not cognition is literally distributed in the causal sense that Harnad (2005) seems to 
mean, it still might be a useful way to characterize some aspects of nonhuman mentality. For, 
although other animals seem not to understand more opaque concepts like belief (Tomasello, 
2014), more basic concepts like attention or intention, which are more easily made manifest in 
nonverbal behavior, might be aptly described in a distributed manner.  
 
Leavens, Racine, and Hopkins (2009) argue that joint attention is such a concept because it 
"necessarily requires a history of interaction between two or more subjects, some shared 
referent and some particular sociocultural and physical surround" (p. 12). They claim that "joint 
attention is paradigmatically a distributed cognitive act." Our claim is a definitional one; this is 
what counts as (joint) attention, and understood in this manner it can be useful to describe it as 
distributed cognition. It also makes it clear that whatever caused an agent to, for example, point 
in the right sort of pointing environment is independent of these definitional issues; to put this 
differently and with added strength, we can investigate the causes of joint attentional behavior 
because we know what counts as joint attention (Racine & Müller, 2009). As Harnad (2016) also 
notes, we can also sometimes attribute mental state concepts by measuring brain activity and 
knowing that a particular brain state is correlated to a given mental state. In such a case, for 
example, a brain scan or EEG pattern can serve as a new definition for an existing concept; 
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again, we know what counts as an understanding of beliefs, and when this part of the brain 
lights up we can count it as indexing belief understanding. All of this is good science. 
 
For researchers interested not only in animal sentience but also animal intersubjectivity then, 
Harnad's (2016) other-minds challenge is particularly apt. Harnad's solution is also apt; other 
animals lack language, which is a primary way in which we express our mental states and 
understand them in others. An implication of this though is that sincere first-person reports of 
one's state of mind are incorrigible; unlike the third-person case, I cannot doubt my internal 
states, I can only express them. Of course, I can lie about my mental states, or can think or feel 
something that I do not express; in this sense Harnad is correct that there is always some 
problem of other minds. Although Harnad claims that animals, bereft of languages, face a more 
severe problem of other minds, he also opens the door to animal mentality by acknowledging 
that mental state attribution also involves nonverbal behavior, which, fleshed out a bit more, 
includes the context of attribution. In a similar way, Kiley-Worthington (2016) claims that 
animals, despite lacking language, do not really face such a problem because their 
communication is presumably embedded in mutually understood routines and practices. 
 
I am in sympathy with Kiley-Worthington (2016), but also Harnad (2016) because humans are in 
some respects mind readers par excellence by virtue of the fact that human life can involve 
complicated forms of representation and intrinsically intersubjective linguistic symbols. I have 
also suggested that, at least for mental state attribution, communication is contextual, whether 
for human or nonhuman animals. I have argued further that depending on the mental state in 
question, human and nonhuman animals might well be at equal footing and that we have a 
tendency to elevate the mentality of humans over other animals by conflating the cause and 
definition of a mental state concept (Leavens & Racine, 2009; Leavens et al., 2009; Racine, 
2012). I have used the term “distributed cognition” to foreground its indexical nature, which 
also brings into focus the relation between the background circumstances of behavior and the 
attribution of mental state concepts. When mentality is framed in this manner, it is easier to see 
when human and nonhuman capacities converge — and where they diverge. However, there 
will always be some uncertainty about what is really in an agent's mind, whether a human or 
nonhuman animal; that is the nature of mental state concepts. This uncertainly though does not 
mean we should give similar patterns of behavior a starkly different meaning. For, it is 
behavioral similarity that is the most relevant factor for the attribution of the folk psychological 
concepts in this area of research; and, it might be this fact that underlies Harnad's (2016) 
observation that, "thanks to our acute mind-reading abilities, we grant the benefit of the doubt 
— to some degree — to mammals and birds, because they and their young resemble us (and 
especially resemble our young)" (p. 6). 
 
The following quote from Wittgenstein (2009), which in part underscores the pragmatic context 
of decisions about what should and should not count as evidence for a particular mental state, 
suggests that there are no hard and fast rules here. It also implies that to the extent that we 
apply human mental state concepts to animals, it is often in a restricted and more rudimentary 
form. 
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Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. — One says to oneself: How could one 
so much get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing. One might as well ascribe it to a 
number! — And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish, and 
pain seems to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too 
smooth. (§284, emphasis in original)  
 
Why do we resist the application of sensation concepts to a stone? In some ways, it is simple as 
the fact that it is in our existing languages and the practices with which they are tied up, it 
makes no sense to do so in a literal sense, although perhaps it might in some restricted 
metaphorical use. It is not just language though; it is also the fact that humans tend to react 
differently to stones than we do to flies and other animals. Harnad's discussion of Descartes's 
view of animals provides insight into the ways that these uses and conceptions might change 
over historical time and cultural context. However, if it were determined, for example, that 
animals did not activate Descartes's mirror neuron system, such an empirical finding would have 
little bearing on the use of pain concepts (Racine, Wereha, & Leavens, 2012). Things are 
different for flies, argues Wittgenstein, because they have the ability to behave in such a way as 
to exhibit what counts, at least roughly or pragmatically, as pain behavior. In most languages 
and the practices with which they are tied up, stones are not likely the sorts of objects that can 
have sensations; that is, to grasp the meaning of “sensation” is to know that one does not 
attribute such a concept to a stone.  
 
Still, one might protest, how do we really know that a wriggling fly is in pain? This objection 
comes in large part, I suspect, as a consequence of the Cartesian view of mind; the belief that 
we know about our inner states by observing them through introspection, and, derivatively, by 
introspectively feeling them in the way that Harnad seems to mean. However, although we can 
believe something we later find to be false, we do not typically doubt (or not doubt) our own 
mental states because there are no grounds for doubt. By contrast, in the third-person case, we 
can and do get it wrong. For example, a human might well be in pain, but choose, stoically, not 
to express it linguistically or behaviorally. Similarly, a chimpanzee might well conceal an inner 
state from a conspecific in competitive circumstances (Tomasello, 2014). Therefore, from a 
point of view that sees mental state attribution as tied up with relevant patterns of behavior, 
the question of how we really know that a wriggling fly is in pain can equally be paraphrased, 
"Do we have grounds for doubting that a wriggling fly is in pain?" And one could equally ask, "Do 
we have reason to think that the wriggling fly is trying to pull one over on us when it exhibits 
what we would typically take to be pain behavior?" I take it that the obvious answer is no — and 
not because of facts about nervous systems, interesting as they might be, but rather facts about 
what counts as pain-behavior (and, for that matter, pretense). 
 
In conclusion, as scientists or laypeople we have little choice but to use our existing languages 
and their motley crew of mental state concepts in our attempts to understand the minds of 
other animals. Although this makes language an important consideration when theorizing about 
animal minds, it should not be understood as a theoretical claim that language is a requirement 
for developing mental state concepts. This issue is more about the grounds for mental state 
attribution, which, as Harnad (2016) notes in the case of humans often involves language 
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because what a person says of, for example, their intentions, desires and beliefs is an expression 
of those very states and therefore the best logical evidence for their possession. However, some 
mental states can be evidenced on behavioral grounds and these are states we can easily 
attribute to other animals. This is not anthropomorphism but rather concept use. Although this 
allows us to ascribe shared mentality when justified, for example, in the illustration of joint 
attention, as the Clever Hans case suggests, there are still logical limits to how far many human 
psychological concepts can be applied. The challenge for those interested in the investigation of 
animal subjectivity and intersubjectivity lies in part in applying our existing mental state 
concepts in ways that are sensitive to the needs of the scientist, but that do not unintentionally 
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